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From Corporate Responsibility to Corporate
Accountability
Min Yan* and Daoning Zhang**
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of corporate responsibility or corporate social
responsibility (“CSR”) keeps evolving since it appeared. The emphasis was
first placed on business people’s social conscience rather than on the
company itself, which was well reflected by Howard Bowen’s landmark
book, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman.1 Then CSR was defined as
responsibilities to society, which extends beyond economic and legal
obligations by corporations.2 Since then, corporate responsibility is thought
to begin where the law ends. 3 In other words, the concept of social
responsibility largely excludes legal obedience from the concept of social
responsibility. An analysis of 37 of the most used definitions of CSR also
shows “voluntary” as one of the most common dimensions.4 Put differently,
corporate responsibility reflects the belief that corporations have duties
beyond generating profits for their shareholders. Such responsibilities
include: the negative duty to refrain from causing harm to the environment,
individuals and communities; as well as positive duties to actively engage in
activities to improve society and environment, for example, protecting
human rights of workers and communities affected by business activities.
Although corporate accountability is sometimes used interchangeably
with corporate responsibility, the concept of corporate accountability is not
synonymous with corporate responsibility. Corporate responsibility is
* Assistant Professor in Business Law, Queen Mary University of London, England;
m.yan@qmul.ac.uk.
** Assistant Professor in Law, Canterbury Christ Church University, England;
daoningzhang@gmail.com.
1. HOWARD R. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESSMAN 7 (1953).
2. See, e.g., JOSEPH W. MCGUIRE, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 144 (1963).
3. Keith Davis, The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities, 16
ACAD. MGMT. J. 312, 313 (1973); Marcel V. Marrewijk & Marco Werre, Multiple Levels of Corporate
Sustainability: Between Agency and Communication, 44 J. BUS. ETHICS 107, 107-119 (2003).
4. Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: An Analysis of 37
Definitions, 15 CORP. SOC. RESPONSIB. ENVIRON. MGMT. 1-13 (2008).
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focusing on voluntary approaches to engage with social/environmental
issues,5 while corporate accountability is more about the confrontational or
enforceable framework of influencing corporate behaviour. 6 Corporate
accountability focuses more on establishing institutional mechanisms that
hold companies accountable rather than merely urging companies to act
toward a socially desirable end voluntarily. 7 In this regard, corporate
accountability could be understood as corporate control—the ability of those
affected by a corporation to control the corporate behaviour. Despite the
controversial argument which claims that companies should be controlled by
society, today’s public companies, especially those large ones with
enormous social impact, can hardly be seen as entirely private concerns.8 In
effect, shareholders have lost much of its de jure or de facto control in many
jurisdictions due to the development of modern corporate law as well as the
separation between ownership and control.9
On the ground that voluntary CSR is inadequate to deliver the necessary
change and to secure more socially responsible activities, corporate
accountability will continue to grow. Accordingly, pressure exerted by social
and governmental actors beyond the company itself will influence corporate
behaviour. Such actors can adopt a wide range of strategies, including, but
not limited to, the mobilisation of legal mechanisms through reward and
punishment to enforce social standards.
This paper will, therefore, propose a framework for corporate
accountability that focuses on implementing, rather than introducing, rights
and duties for companies. Accountability could be referred to as “the
perception of defending or justifying one’s conduct to an audience that has
reward or sanction authority, and where rewards or sanctions are perceived
to be contingent upon audience evaluation of such conduct.”10 In order to
build an enforceable framework for corporate accountability against a wider
society, it is essential to establish more precise means for sanctioning failure
amounts to the fundamental element of corporate control. Unlike the
neoclassical version of corporate accountability (i.e., companies should be
5. Davis, supra note 3, at 107.
6. For example, in international relations and public administration literatures, accountability is
about questioning, directing, sanctioning, or constraining others’ actions. See Kate Macdonald, The
Meaning and Purposes of Transnational Accountability, 73 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 426, 428 (2014).
7. See Carmen Valor, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards
Corporate Accountability, 110 BUS. & SOC. REV. 191, 196 (2005).
8. See, e.g., JOHN PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE THEORY
OF COMPANY LAW 22 (1993) (noting that it is well argued that these large companies are no longer private
organisations because they have the ability to exercise social decision-making power).
9. See, e.g., MIN YAN, BEYOND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMISATION 10 (2018).
10. Danielle Beu & M. Ronald Buckley, The Hypothesized Relationship between Accountability
and Ethical Behaviour, 34 J. BUS. ETHICS 57, 61 (2001).
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accountable only to shareholders), 11 actors other than shareholders can
sanction corporate results based on the existing institutional framework if the
concept of corporate accountability can be adopted. One typical example is
where market participants are able to sanction or constrain corporate
behaviour through market mechanisms. However, due to the inadequacy of
market forces, or failure of the market, as will be discussed in the next
section, multilayers of disciplines are required for a workable corporate
accountability framework. In particular, the law’s ability to frame such an
accountability framework becomes extremely important.
Studies have already provided abundant empirical evidence on the
significant role of different stakeholders on CSR-related activities.12 This
paper will, as a result, focus on how the primary stakeholder groups, whose
continuing participation is essential to the survival of the company as a going
concern,13 can enforce and ensure corporate accountability through the law
under the existing institutional framework. It is important to note that this
paper mainly focuses on irresponsible corporate behaviour that does not
necessarily breach the mandatory law.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II critically
discusses how market discipline ensures corporate accountability. Section III
examines how the primary stakeholder groups, including shareholders,
employees, customers, suppliers, community, and creditors, can potentially
employ the existing legal mechanisms14 to ensure corporate accountability
even when a company’s conduct remains in compliance with the law. Section
IV then discusses regulations in general, serving as side constraint, and
improving the bottom line for corporate behaviour. Section V provides some
concluding remarks at the end.

II. MARKET MECHANISM
The contemporary CSR with an essentially voluntary nature has
intellectual roots in neoliberal economics. Neoliberalism as a new economic
orthodoxy advocates: “new forms of political-economic governance
11. Shareholders are neither the sole residual claimant nor the sole residual risk taker. See, e.g., Min
Yan, Agency Theory Re-examined: An Agency Relationship and Residual Claimant Perspective, 26 INT'L
COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL L. REV. 139, 140 (2015).
12. See, e.g., Jedrzej George Frynas & Camila Yamahaki, Corporate Social Responsibility: Review
and Roadmap of Theoretical Perspectives, 25 BUS. ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REV. 258, 266 (2016).
13. Max B.E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social
Performance, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 92, 106 (1995) (noting that although there are different categories
of primary stakeholder groups, it generally includes shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, the
community, the government, and the environment).
14. For example, using competition law, corporate law, insolence law, contract law, and tort law as
a binding force to hold companies accountable.
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premised on the extension of market relationships[.]” 15 Free markets are
consequently treated as the best way to ensure the most efficient allocation
of resources, hence the maximization of wealth and welfare. 16
Unsurprisingly, corporate control by a society under neoliberalism can only
occur through the market; namely, only the market can sanction noncompliance or failures.
Market forces include product market discipline, capital market
discipline, and labour market discipline, which are also used under the
conventional corporate responsibility framework to justify or incentivise
companies to behave responsibly. The assumption is that the product, capital,
and labour markets will influence corporate behaviour by penalizing poor
performers (i.e., social irresponsibility) and rewarding good ones (i.e., social
responsibility).
First, in the product market, or say consumer market, consumer
boycotts are the most visible and acute means of product market response.17
A more generalized form of product market response is ethical purchase
behaviour, namely, to purchase products according to the manufacturer’s
reputation for socially responsible conduct. A positive reputation may
encourage consumers to decide to purchase, while a negative reputation
would likely make consumers avoid the product. Empirical studies show that
increasing numbers of consumers are prepared to spend more on ethical
goods.18 Second, investors in the capital market could also prima facie affect
corporate behaviour via investment policy.19 The rapid growth of socially
responsible investment (“SRI”) funds are a good example that reflects how
the capital market could ensure accountability. For instance, by the end of
2017, the market size of SRI in the U.S. was over $12.0 trillion, a quarter of
all investments under professional management in the U.S.20 Investors take

15. Wendy Larner, Neo-liberalism, Policy, Ideology, Governmentality, 63 STUDIES IN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 5, 5 (2000).
16. See PADDY IRELAND & RENGINEE G. PILLAY, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE 85 (Peter Utting et al. eds., 2010).
17. See N. Craig Smith, Morality and the Market: Consumer Pressure for Corporate
Accountability, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 881 (1991).
18. See, e.g., ANDREW CRANE & DIRK MATTEN, BUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE:
MANAGING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (3d ed.
2003); see also Marylyn Carrigan, Isabelle Szmigin & Joanne Wright, Shopping for a Better World? An
Interpretive Study of the Potential for Ethical Consumption within the Older Market, 21 JOURNAL OF
CONSUMER MARKETING 401, 401-17 (2004).
19. See Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson & Mark A. Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create
Social Value, 44 JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW 205 (2019).
20. See Report on US Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing Trends, The Forum for
Sustainable and Responsible Investment, 2018, https://www.ussif.org/trends; see also Adam Connaker &
Saadia Madsbjerg, The State of Socially Responsible Investing, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 17, 2019,
https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-state-of-socially-responsible-investing.
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social (and environmental) performance into consideration and divest in
socially irresponsible companies, which in turn creates adverse effects on the
share price. Third, companies in the labour market with poor reputations will
find it more difficult or costly to recruit and retain employees, while images
of responsible companies will have a positive impact on employees’ morale
and productivity.
A company is, to a large extent, an economic entity. This determines it
has to survive in the market first of all. Different markets could accordingly
affect and discipline corporate behaviour. However, one should not overlook
the weakness of market discipline. For the product market, ethical
considerations may easily be outweighed by conventional product attributes,
such as quality, value for money, and service.21 Meanwhile, the scope of
issues attracting high levels of consumer interest is limited. 22 Empirical
evidence further suggests that consumers are selectively ethical. 23
Sometimes there could be a boycott against products made by irresponsible
firms, but such momentum is normally difficult to sustain. For those nonconsumer-oriented companies (i.e., not selling directly into consumer
markets and hence, not brand sensitive) or those with monopolistic powers,
the disciplinary pressure from the product market is also understandably
inadequate.
In the capital market, ethical investment and SRI funds remain small
compared to the size of the entire equity market. More importantly, there will
always be socially-neutral buyers for shares in companies that ethical funds
reject, which implies that their share price and cost of capital will be
unaffected by the irresponsibility. 24 The crucial question is whether
institutional investors would be ready to permit or encourage their investee
companies to work on their social performance if it were to the companies’

21. See Roger Cowe & Simon William, Who are the Ethical Consumers?, THE CO-OPERATIVE
BANK, 2000, at 2.
22. For example, child labour, sweatshops, genetically modified organism and environmental issues
are more likely to attract consumers’ attention, but consumers may be insensitive to some wider
employment issues, such as gender equality, due to their very nature. In other words, some ethical
concerns are to a lesser degree expressed in consumers’ buying behaviour. Moreover, although there was
a high awareness of high-profile companies’ socially irresponsible behaviours, awareness was generally
low in relation to ethical behaviours. See, e.g., id. at 11-12.
23. Marylyn Carrigan and Ahmad Attalla, The Myth of the Ethical Consumer: Do Ethics Matter in
Purchase Behaviour? 18 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER MARKETING 560-577 (2001) (arguing that consumers’
purchase behaviour is not always influenced by their social criteria). There is also empirical evidence
showing that social responsibility was not an important consideration in consumers’ purchasing
behaviours. See id. at 565.
24. See EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER: A TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND STUDY 269 (1981); Brest, Gilson & Wolfson, supra note 19, at 14 (“[A]ny premium in the valuation
of shares that results from socially-motivated investors clamoring to own them presents an opportunity
for socially-neutral bargain-hunters to profit from selling shares that overprices.”).

2 - YAN _ZHANG - V9 - KC - 10.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

48

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

11/15/2019 11:11 AM

[Vol. 16:1

financial detriment. The collective action problem and conflicts of interest
would inevitably lead to a general reluctance of institutional investors to
intervene in their investee companies’ internal affairs, though they are
encouraged to be more actively involved.
It is argued that “[leaving] corporate control in the hands of the market
is a political decision that could be reversed, and should be reversed when
evidence shows that markets are not successfully changing corporate
practices.”25 In short, markets can discipline corporate behaviour to some
degree but not always sufficiently,26 hence, other disciplinary mechanisms
are urgently needed to ensure corporate accountability.

III. LEGAL MECHANISM
Law has an important role to play in restraining corporate behaviour
through its reward and sanction system. In fact, many CSR-related issues
concerning the environment, health, and safety, are already regulated by the
law.27 The challenge here is how to use legal mechanisms to make companies
accountable even when they do not violate the existing law and how primary
stakeholder groups could enforce accountability.
The first part of this section discusses tort law, which bears a close
connection to corporate responsibility and explores the possibility for
victims of irresponsible corporate behaviour to use tort law as a weapon
against the wrongdoer. The second part discusses the potential of
competition law to be used by customers and other market participants, such
as competitors holding companies accountable for their behaviour. The third
part examines the role of contract law in ensuring accountability by
transforming voluntary commitments into enforceable obligations, such as
in a supply chain. This part also explores whether employees and other
relevant third parties could use contract law to enforce a company’s
voluntary CSR commitments. The fourth part discusses how companies can
provide both shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders opportunities
to affect corporate accountability. Last but not least, the fifth part focuses on
both voluntary and involuntary creditors, including tort victims using
insolvency law to hold companies accountable for their behaviour.
25. Carmen Valor, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards Corporate
Accountability, 110 BUS. & SOC. REV. 191, 201 (2005).
26. Companies are, as a result, “likely to fulfill their responsibility in a minimalist and fragmented
fashion.” Peter Utting et al. eds., Visible Hands: Taking Responsibility for Social Development, UNRISD
Report for Geneva 90 (2000). Moreover, empirical evidence also shows “good” companies do not
necessarily prosper and “bad” companies do not necessarily lose out. See id. at 70.
27. JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LIMITATIONS
AND OPPORTUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2006).
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A. TORT LAW
CSR-related issues, such as safety and health protection for workers and
environmental protection, bear a close connection to tort law.28 When Eilbert
and Parket attempted to define CSR, they argued the best way to understand
social responsibility is to think of it as “good neighbourliness.” 29 This
concept involves two phases. First, it means not doing things that spoil the
neighbourhood. Second, it can be expressed as the voluntary assumption of
the obligation to help solve neighbourhood problems.30 In this regard, the
neighbour principle in tort law is helpful in ensuring corporate accountability
across the industry.
Lord Atkin famously said in Donoghue v. Stevenson that “the rule that
you are to love your neighbour becomes in law . . . You must take reasonable
care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be
likely to injure your neighbour . . .” 31 Regarding corporate behaviour, it
could undoubtedly affect our society in many different ways, so a company
should take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which it can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure any part of the society. This is
not inconsistent with Waddock’s view, which is that “companies need to
assume responsibility for the impacts of their practices and processes and the
decision that stands behind those practices[.]”32
It would be easier to hold companies accountable for their behaviour by
adopting the tools of tort law. A company will have a duty to change its
behaviour or adopt preventative measures if a reasonable person would have
foreseen acts that would affect other parties (i.e., the likelihood of injury). If
the company fails to do so, which in turn causes any harm to other members
of the society, then the victims or their representatives would be allowed to
sue the company for damages.
Tort law can be relied upon to provide extra help to victims even though
there is no physical or legal proximity between the alleged companies and
the victims. Especially in the context of group companies, a parent company
can be held liable for harm caused to the employees of its subsidiaries,
despite the principle of corporate separate personality. In other words, a
subsidiary company’s employee who is a tort victim, can possibly claim that
the parent company owes a duty of care to her and thereby seek recourse
28. See ANDREAS RÜHMKORF, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL
SUPPLY Chains 164 (Janet Dine et al. eds., 2015).
29. Henry Eilbert & I. Robert Parket, The Current Status of Corporate Social Responsibility, 16
BUS. HORIZONS 4, 7 (1973).
30. See id. at 7.
31. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, 580 (U.K.) (emphasis added).
32. SANDRA WADDOCK, LEADING CORPORATE CITIZENS 219 (1st ed. 2002).
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through tort law remedies. 33 For multinational companies, it becomes
possible for local victims of unsound safety and health policies,
environmental pollution, and human right infringement, to consider
litigation abroad in the state of the parent companies.34
One good example is the innovative use of the U.S. Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”). 35 This statute is used to hold companies accountable for their
breaches of duties of human rights protection, environmental protection, or
employees’ welfare. It allows a non-U.S. citizen to sue a company, which
commits a wrong to the person based on treaties under international law or
norms under international customary law.36 Since domestic law may include
treaties and norms under international customary law, the U.S. gains
jurisdiction to hear a wide range of tort law cases.37 As a result, multinational
companies may have direct liability to certain victims under ATS. However,
after a recent case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co,38 the U.S. Supreme
Court curbs the universal jurisdiction by requiring tort claims to touch and
concern U.S. territory. When these claims do not, the ATS remains a viable
alternative to redress for tort victims.
Tort law in other jurisdictions can also potentially work as a weapon for
victims of human rights infringement or environmental pollution. Besides
general tort law doctrines, such as negligence, special forms of tort
regulation may help reduce the evidential burden for victims. Take product
liability, a unique form of tort, for example. Under Part I of the U.K.
Consumer Protection Act of 1987, traders may be subject to strict liability
whereby aggrieved consumers can sue traders producing faulty products
without needing to prove manufacturer negligence.
In short, due to the duty of care companies owe to the general public to
avoid causing them harm, victims of irresponsible corporate behaviour could
choose to turn to tort law to hold such companies accountable.

33. See, e.g., Chandler v. Cape plc, [2012] E.W.C.A. Civ 525 (explaining that a party company may
owe a duty of care to its employees and its subsidiaries, despite subsidiaries being separate legal persons,
where it failed to provide a secure work environment to employees exposed to asbestos).
34. See LIESBETH ENNEKING, FOREIGN DIRECT LIABILITY AND BEYOND: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF
TORT LAW IN PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
44 (A.G. Castermans et al., eds., 2012).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
36. Liesbeth Enneking, The Future of Foreign Direct Liability? Exploring the International
Relevance of the Dutch Shell Nigeria Case, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 44 (2014).
37. See Erenest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational PublicLaw Litigation after Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1049 (2015).
38. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
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B. COMPETITION AND UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
The main objective of competition law at a macro-level is to protect the
freedom of consumers to make informed choices and maintain free-market
competition. In addition to antitrust rules, there are also rules governing
unfair commercial practices to protect customers from detrimental effects,
such as unfair competition at a micro-level.39
The U.S. case Kasky v. Nike40 discussed below is an excellent example
of how competition law can be used to hold companies that conduct unfair
commercial practices accountable. Nike had been actively writing press
releases, sending letters to newspapers, athletic directors, and university
administrations, since the early 1990s, claiming that workers in Nike
factories were well treated. In 1997, an employee of Nike leaked a
confidential audit prepared by Ernest and Young about Nike’s sweatshop
and labour practices in Southeast Asia. 41 The leaked audit showed that
Nike’s statements in these press releases and letters were either false or
misleading. In 1998, Marc Kasky, an activist in California, brought a lawsuit
against Nike for unfair and deceptive practices (i.e., issuing false or
misleading statements to the people of California); specifically, the lawsuit
alleged Nike violated labour practices under California’s Unfair Competition
Law and False Advertising Law.42 The case was finally settled out of court,
with Nike paying $1.5 million to the Fair Labor Association.43
It is clear from Nike that voluntary CSR reports and codes of conduct
may have legal repercussions. Put it differently, companies can continue to
39. On the macro-level, the competition law strives to maintain fair competition among competitors
so that efficient firms are chosen by the customers and, at the same time, the social welfare that arises
from the competition, is maximised. On the micro-level, it aims to guarantee that customers can obtain a
fair share of such maximisation of overall social welfare; a dominant seller in the market may, therefore,
have a special responsibility to not abuse its position at the expense of customers’ welfare. See BERT
KEIRSBILCK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LAW OF UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES AND COMPETITION LAW
540 (2011). The latter part of the law bears close connection to intellectual property (“IP”) law. As in
many cases, unfair commercial practices may involve infringement of IP rights. See also DAMIEN
GERADIN, ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR & NICOLAS PETIT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 20-22 (1st
ed. 2012).
40. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002) [hereinafter Nike].
41. The audit stated that workers in the Nike factory were exposed to toxic chemicals without
protection, subjected to physical, verbal and sexual abuse, forced to work illegal excess overtime without
proper pay, and suffered from poor ventilation and lack of drinking water. Most people in the factories
were women under the age of 24. See id. at 947.
42. California consumer-protection law that allows one person to sue a company on behalf of all
the people of California for consumer-protection violations. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (2019).
Id. at 962.
43. The settlement also involved investments by Nike to strengthen workplace monitoring and
factory worker programmes. See Lisa Girion, Nike Settles Lawsuit Over Labor Claims, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
13, 2003), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-sep-13-fi-nike13-story.html.
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tell their stories, but they need to be more careful that what they say is
accurate. Businesses will find that they may also be held legally liable for
their voluntary disclosure (among other voluntary initiatives). Any voluntary
declarations or disclosures may turn out to have legal implications.44
Apart from public enforcement,45 private parties can lodge complaints
as an indirect means to initiate an investigation of anti-competitive activities,
unfair commercial practices, or initiate litigation to claim a breach of contract
in terms of an infringement of competition law. 46 For example, a market
participant can claim compensation by initiating a petition under articles 101
and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)
against companies who abuse their market position in a national court. 47
Consumers and competitors can also choose to complain to relevant national
competition authorities or the European Commission to seek remedies under
the E.U. antitrust law, for example.
In the U.K., the introduction of the Consumer Protection from Unfair
Trading Regulations (“CPUT”) 48 was a response to the E.U. Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive (“UCPD”)49. When customers believe that
they are the victims of unfair commercial practices conducted by traders,
they can sue the traders based on a new amendment of CPUT; i.e., § 1(3) of
the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations of 2014.50 For example,
when a company fails to keep its word that it promised in its code of conduct,
its behaviour may amount to a misleading action under regulation 5(3)(b) of
CPUT.
Accordingly, consumers, who have contracts with traders, are able to
sue traders and require a full or partial repayment of the price of goods and/or
services; provided that traders are or ought to have been aware of their
misleading behaviours, that are likely to change the average consumers
decisions regarding whether to buy products from the traders. 51 Unless
44. Anna Beckers, Legalization Under the Premises of Globalization: Why and Where to Enforce
Corporate Social Responsibility Codes, 24, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 15, 23 (2017) (providing a
related example here: the E.U. Consumer Sales Directive Article 2(d) imposes a duty on sellers of goods
whereby they need to comply with public statements with regard to the characteristics of their goods).
45. Given the nature of the anti-competitive practices, public enforcement by public authorities are
frequently the main solution to deal with competition law cases. DAMIEN GERADIN, ANNE LAYNEFARRAR & NICOLAS PETIT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 322, 324-27 (1st ed. 2012).
46. See JOHN FAIRHURST, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 754 (10th ed. 2014).
47. MICHAEL.J. FRESE, SANCTIONS IN EU COMPETITION LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 4 (2012).
The author points out that public bodies may also commence public enforcement through a European
competition network within the E.U. Id. at 15. Similarly, article 11 of the E.U. Directive on Unfair
Commercial Practices opens the door for both administrative enforcement and private law solutions. Id.
48. Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1277 (U.K.).
49. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005, SI 2005/29/EC.
50. The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/870 (U.K.).
51. Id. at Part 4A.
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consumers would like to claim damages arising from inconvenience or
certain financial expenses at more than the value of the products, consumers
have nearly no burden to prove trader faults, such as dishonesty, negligence,
or their losses.52 The strict liabilities imposed on the traders would have a
far-reaching impact regarding their promises to the public. 53 Therefore,
regulations such as CPUT can offer consumers an edge that is not otherwise
available under traditional common law.
The UCPD regulates communication between companies and
customers.54 It is worth noting that communication-related responsibilities
may also be a part of CSRs, as companies frequently prescribe beyond-law
responsibilities like human rights, environment, and consumer protection in
their codes of conduct. Apart from the reputation damage caused by
breaching of these promises, in some cases, companies are also legally liable
to customers for misleading communication. Therefore, for those
traditionally voluntary duties provided by companies’ codes of conduct,
which are implemented and made available to the public, consumers can
potentially sue companies for their breach if the codes materially influence
the consumers’ transactional behaviours. In other words, failure to keep
these promises in certain situations may amount to misleading
communication.

C. CONTRACT LAW
Following the idea behind the foregoing competition law control,
another viable mechanism to ensure accountability is to transform voluntary
commitments into legally enforceable obligation. For example, a company
could increasingly include CSR commitments into the terms and conditions
in contracts with their suppliers to formalize CSR commitments as legal
obligations.55 It is also possible to require external suppliers to adopt CSR
codes of conduct via legal mechanisms, such as procurement contracts, to
ensure accountability.
Of course, other contractual techniques could also be used to make CSR
enforceable, such as perpetual clauses. Through a perpetual clause, one party
52. Id. at Part 4A(27J).
53. See Misleading and Aggressive Commercial Practices: New Private Rights For Consumers,
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 10 (2018).
54. Anna Beckers, The Regulation of Market Communication and Market Behaviour: Corporate
Social Responsibility and the Directives on Unfair Commercial Practices and Unfair Contract Terms, 54
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 475, 481-83 (2017).
55. See DOREEN MCBARNET, AURORA VOICULESCU & TOM CAMPBELL, THE NEW CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (2007); see also ANNA BECKERS,
ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND
NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 48 (Hugh Collins et al., eds. 2015).
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may require another to impose duties on the latter’s suppliers to meet the
same standards or terms so that the same clause will bind all upstream or
downstream parties.56 However, the success of this mechanism depends on
the bargaining power.
Promises made by companies in codes of conduct may add economic
value to each company through fostering mutual trust and long-term
relationships, which is a reasonable justification for companies to keep their
own words. Failure to comply may not only result in unfair commercial
practices, as explained earlier but misrepresentation, as well. 57 Also,
equitable doctrines, such as promissory estoppel, could further stop
companies from reneging on their promises. For instance, suppliers and
employees may be committed to deliver high-quality goods or services to
companies and make firm-specific investments based on companies’ CSR
commitments. Stakeholders who detrimentally rely upon a company’s words
deserve more protection and may have a claim against the company.58
It is also worth noting that many jurisdictions allow third parties to
enforce contract terms even if they are not a party. 59 Contract law could
potentially give contracting parties at both the domestic and international
level the power to provide third parties enforceable rights. 60 This power
overrides the limitation brought by the privity of contract and potentially
enables third parties to monitor the implementation of CSR-related promises
made by companies.
A good attempt is in Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., where the defendant
Wal-Mart wrote a code of conduct into its contract with suppliers that
required suppliers to comply with all relevant employee protection standards
and improve their work environment.61 Later, it turned out that Wal-Mart
disregarded its promises and continued to purchase goods from suppliers
who did not meet these standards. 62 The question was whether overseas
workers, who claimed themselves to be third-party beneficiaries, were
entitled to sue Wal-Mart with recourse through contract law.63 Under the U.S.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the promise should flow from promisor
56. See, e.g., Paul Verbruggen, Regulatory Governance by Contract: The Rise of Regulatory
Standards in Commercial Contracts, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID 79, 89 (2014).
57. See Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the
Invisible Handshake, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 925, 928 (1985).
58. See Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45, 78
(1996).
59. See Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (c. 31).
60. See Paul Verbruggen, Regulatory Governance by Contract: The Rise of Regulatory Standards
in Commercial Contracts, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID 79, 90 (2014).
61. Jane Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2007 WL 5975664 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (unreported).
62. See id. at 1-2.
63. See id. at 3.
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A to the third-party beneficiary rather than from promisee B to the thirdparty.64 In this case, without sufficient evidence to show Wal-Mart made a
contractually-binding promise to workers, the lawyers of overseas workers
argued that it was the intent of promisee, i.e., suppliers, to protect overseas
workers’ interest.65 Although the court did not support this argument,66 its
potential cannot be dismissed.
D. CORPORATE LAW

Directors’ duty may be required by corporate law to not only focus on
shareholder interests but also broader social and environmental issues when
making corporate decisions. 67 If directors’ fiduciary duties to a company
could be redefined in a way to cover the interests of various stakeholders,
then a more accountable decision-making process can be expected. For
example, the U.K. Companies Act of 2006 mandates directors to regard
stakeholders’ interests, including employees, communities, and others, when
promoting the long-term interests of the company. Currently, stakeholders
other than shareholders do not have a say in internal corporate governance
systems68 or external litigation processes (e.g., directive actions). Setting out
a list of specific factors requiring consideration can at least “expand the
grounds for judicial review of directors’ decision-making[.]”69
Shareholders could, of course, engage through proposals and their
voting power. They could file CSR-related shareholder proposals at annual
general meetings, which would constitute a formal and visible signal of
shareholders’ discontent about a specific social or environmental issue. 70
Such visible signals may be consistent with the logic behind SRI funds,
which is driven by financial concerns—associated with traditional
shareholders’ interests—or by investors’ social and environmental moral

64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
65. Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (2009).
66. Id.
67. The distinction between the shareholder interests and wider society’s interests is important as
conflicts are sometimes inevitable. See, e.g., Min Yan, The Corporate Objective Revisited: Part II, 38
BUS. L. REV. 55, 60 (2017).
68. For example, a possible solution to further increase corporate accountability to society is to allow
representatives of main stakeholder groups to sit in the board meetings.
69. GEOFFREY MORSE, PALMER’S COMPANY LAW ¶ 8.2613 (2019); see also Jingchen Zhao,
Promoting More Socially Responsible Corporations Through a Corporate Law Regulatory Framework,
37 LEGAL STUDIES 103 (2017).
70. See Parthiban David, M. Bloom & Amy J. Hillman, Investor Activism, Managerial
Responsiveness, and Corporate Social Performance, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. JOURNAL 91 (2007); Erin M.
Reid, and Michael W. Toffel, Responding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate Disclosure of
Climate Change Strategies, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. JOURNAL 1157 (2009).
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principles. 71 However, shareholder activism could be both positive and
negative. It is not uncommon for activist shareholders to use the same
strategies to press directors to push share prices, even at the expense of other
corporate constituents.
In addition to the role played by directors and shareholders, sufficient,
reliable, and timely information disclosure can also be employed under the
company law to ensure accountability. 72 Information disclosure can be
utilised as a part of company law mechanism to all relevant stakeholder
groups as to how the company has performed. Take the revised U.K.
Companies Act of 2006, for example. The new Chapter 4A of Part 12, in
replacing § 417 “Directors’ Report,” requires directors of a company to
prepare a “Strategic Report,” including information relating to environmental matters and employee matters. 73 Further details about societal,
community, and human rights issues, as well as the effectiveness of any
company policies concerning those matters, is required to be disclosed in
cases of listed companies.74
Although reporting itself does not prescribe a change in the underlying
corporate behaviour and force corporations to be more accountable, it can
strengthen the market forces. As Schwartz and Carroll pointed out, “[for]
there to be real accountability, [a] business must engage in a process of
providing sufficient, accurate, timely, and verifiable disclosure of all of its
activities (e.g., through auditing and reporting) when such activities might
affect others.”75 Apart from stimulating and strengthening public pressure on
corporations to improve their social and environmental performance, the socalled “greenwashing” or “window-dressing risk” can also be mitigated by
increased transparency and comprehensive information because customers
and other members of the society could more easily assess and compare
corporate social performance.76 A clearly defined mandatory CSR reporting
framework would at least prevent corporations from providing selective
information or solely concentrating on positive aspects.77 Such a framework

71. See Maria L. Goranova and Lori V. Ryan, Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review,
40 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 1230-1268 (2014); Yan, supra note 9, at 98-109.
72. See, e.g., Min Yan, Corporate Social Responsibility vs. Shareholder Value Maximization:
Through the Lens of Hard and Soft Law, 40 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS (2019). Sufficient, reliable, and timely
information disclosure may be regulated by securities law in some countries.
73. U.K. Companies Act 2006 §§ 414A, 414C.
74. Id. at § 414C.
75. Mark S. Schwartz & Archie B. Carroll, Integrating and Unifying Competing and
Complementary Frameworks: The Search for a Common Core in the Business and Society Field, 47 BUS.
& SOC’Y 148, 171 (2008).
76. See Yan, supra note 72.
77. Apparently, mandatorily required reporting may be more effective in ensuring the corporate
accountability, but it should be equally borne in mind that disclosure cannot guarantee the success of non-
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could also help to establish an atmosphere for businesses to pay more
attention to their impact on the environment, society, and other issues. After
establishing such a reporting framework, directors and managers with better
information about the effects of their corporate activities might then
voluntarily adopt higher standards.78

E. INSOLVENCY LAW
Multiple values and public policies need to be weighed upon for a metalaw, such as insolvency law. A company’s responsibility to society also plays
an important role in the insolvency law context. 79 Non-shareholding
stakeholders can use insolvency law to protect their interests and hold
companies accountable for their behaviour. It is the main objective for
insolvency laws to pursue various values, including preserving jobs,
protecting stakeholders other than creditors, and protecting local community
interests.80
To begin, creditors can protect themselves by initiating a creditors’
voluntary winding-up procedure or applying to courts to initiate a
compulsory winding-up procedure. A positive account of insolvency law
provides that it distributes losses incurred from debtors’ default by
considering creditors’ respective abilities to bear losses and risks. 81 The

mandatory initiatives.
78. John Parkinson, Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance:
Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3, 32 (2003).
79. For example, certain banks are said to be too big to fail as their failure may give rise to systemic
risks to the whole state or beyond. See Kinga Bauer & Joanna Krasodomska, Social Responsibility of
Organizations: Directions of Changes, 387 PUBL’G HOUSE OF WROCŁAW U. OF ECON. 11, 26 (2015).
80. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 153, 577 (1998)
(noting that some insolvency law scholars, who are called “traditionalists,” believe that economic value
is not the only value that insolvency law should pursue; they believe other stakeholders’ interests should
also be respected); see also Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 764 (1991).
81. For example, certain employees, besides managers, do not have access to financial information
of the company so they have difficulties in predicting the risks of the company where they are working.
The employees also suffer severe hardship when they lose their jobs and, as a result, their incomes.
Furthermore, employees are not experts in shielding their risks, and rarely do they have more than one
job to spread out the risk of a layoff. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777,
790 (1987). Further, Korobkin argued that the reason why companies internalize employees is to reduce
the cost, as employees may accept a remuneration lower than market value. They may expect other
informal benefits from the company, such as a promotion. When a company is wound up, the direct effect
to the employees, among other things, is their reliance on savings and that it is difficult for them to
immediately find another job. Bankruptcy law was described as “dirty complex elastic and interconnected
policies.” Donald R. Korobkin, Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 12
(1996); see also Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 717, 766 (1991).
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availability of the right to make a petition to liquidate a company gives
creditors, and other possible parties, leverage to protect themselves.
Tort victims and employees, among other voluntary and non-voluntary
creditors, will equally participate in the framework of negotiating whether
certain protective mechanisms—not limited to absolute priority, cross-class
cram-down mechanism, and fair and equitable doctrine—are ignored or
misused by liquidators and administrators.82 In other words, when mulling
over a reorganisation plan, creditors can protect their rights by fastening the
consciences of administrators and liquidators, who, in turn, investigate the
business conduct of the insolvent companies. Furthermore, insolvency law
makes companies accountable to tort creditors, who are either employees or
victims of faulty products or pollution. Though those contingent creditors’
debts will mature and due in the future, their debts are still recognised by
insolvency proceedings. 83 For instance, in a famous mass tort case, the
Johns-Manville Corporation had to file a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding due to
its significant tort liabilities arising from exposing its employees to
asbestos.84 The court appointed a legal representative for victims who had
yet to be identified and asked the company to set up a trust fund to settle
future potential claims.85
Stakeholders are also passively protected by miscellaneous tools under
insolvency law. In the U.K., for example, corporate reorganization
proceedings require administrators, who are the officers of courts, to rescue
a company to protect a broad range of stakeholders. 86 It is clear that the
priority of administration is to rescue the insolvent companies themselves,
as opposed to the interests of some secured creditors; only when this goal
cannot be achieved, administrators may consider other objectives, such as
achieving a better result than winding-up for all creditors. 87 Another
important aspect of the reform of insolvency law was that insolvency law
ring-fenced a prescribed portion of assets of a debtor on behalf of unsecured
creditors. As a result, assets subject to floating charges are available to
unsecured creditors to the extent arranged by this “prescribed part
requirement.” This means that secured floating charge holders have to give
up a percentage of debtor companies’ assets for the sake of a wide range of
unsecured creditors. Insolvency law also provides certain weak categories of

82. See Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 (1990).
83. See Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435, 1443 (2004).
84. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 634 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1986).
85. See Listokin and Ayotte, supra note 83, at 1443.
86. See Insolvency Act 1986 (c. 45), Schedule B1 § 3 (U.K.).
87. See id. at § 3(1)(a).
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creditors with preferential creditor status,88 including employees’ wages.89
The law makes clear that the liquidator, administrator, or receiver “shall
make a prescribed part of the company’s net property available for the
satisfaction of unsecured debts.”90
Under certain circumstances, courts would allow stakeholders to sue
debtors to seek relief. 91 Secured creditors who are unable to be fully
protected by insolvency proceedings can seek a lift of stay and take further
actions, as long as the purpose of administration will not be frustrated.92 Such
design shows that it remains possible for private enforcement to be
conducted within insolvency proceedings so that creditors can protect
themselves and make the debtor companies accountable for their conduct.
Public authorities other than courts may also play a role under
insolvency law, generally based on public interest protection. 93 These
authorities can punish companies that conduct illegal businesses, such as
Ponzi schemes, illegal lotteries, or insurance contracts.94
In short, insolvency laws of many countries require companies to
consider stakeholders’ interests. 95 Breach of these obligations can lead to
remedies clearly prescribed by insolvency law.

IV. MULTILAYERS OF ENFORCEMENT
A traditional way to ensure accountability is to use mandatory laws to
control companies’ negative externalities by elevating the social and
environmental bottom lines. 96 For example, the regulatory regimes for
consumer protection laws, employment laws, anti-discrimination laws,

88. Preferential debts include contributions to occupational pension schemes, remuneration of
employees, levies on coal and steel production, and so on. See Insolvency Act 1986 § 386 (U.K.).
89. See id.
90. See id. at § 176.
91. In Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc, [1990] B.C.C. 859, (866) (appeal taken from Ch. Court)
(U.K.). Although the general rule is that litigations against insolvent companies are normally not allowed
in administration and liquidation proceedings, creditors may, subject to the discretion of the court, require
the court to life the moratorium and seek individual remedies. See, e.g., Insolvency Act 1986, sch. B1, §
43(7) (U.K.).
92. In Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc, [1990] B.C.C. 859, 879 (appeal taken from Ch. Court)
(U.K.).
93. See, e.g., Insolvency Act 1986, § 124 (U.K.).
94. See DERECK FRENCH, MAYSON, FRENCH & RYAN ON COMPANY LAW 597 (2018).
95. Take the 1986 U.K. Insolvency Act, for example. Under the Sch B1 § 3, the purpose of
administration proceedings is to rescue the whole insolvent company on behalf of all stakeholders.
96. There is an emerging body of literature on regulating CSR. See, e.g., Adedayo L. Abah, Legal
Regulation of CSR: The Case of Social Media and Gender-Based Harassment, 5 U. BALT. J. MEDIA L. &
ETHICS 38 (2016); Onyeka Osuji, Fluidity of Regulation-CSR Nexus: The Multinational Corporate
Corruption Example, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 31 (2011).
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environmental protection laws, and so on, are about requiring corporations
not to harm the society through banning certain behaviour. It can either
involve public enforcement, where regulations confer investigative power to
authorities and allow them to punish certain business activities; or offer new
remedies to private parties and enable them to seek remedies by suing
companies under certain circumstances.97
Elevating the minimum voluntary obligations of corporations to the
level of obligatory duties by providing incentives/disincentives through the
threat of liability can fill the governance void. Although mandatory
minimum standards may account for only a small portion of the entire set of
mechanisms meant to hold companies accountable, they are undoubtedly at
the core of the overall framework of control. As a result, companies will
either proactively or passively change their original business conduct to
comply with the mandatory requirements. When some parts of originally
voluntary CSRs become legally enforceable under the accountability
regimes, the states are then able to learn from the processes of
implementation and the results achieved.98 As a result, the states’ ability to
regulate social, environmental, and economic affairs can also be improved,
which would further encourage them to advance development more justly.99
Nevertheless, the regulatory gap has some limitations. First, the
hysteresis nature of the laws and legislative processes are self-evident. It
takes time for legislators and policymakers to react to new sources of harm.
Secondly, according to Armour and Gordon, the “regulatory slack,”100 such
as under-specification of regulatory terms and under-enforcement of
regulations, would be exploited by companies to lower costs. Indeed, it may
be more reasonable from an economic standpoint to exploit the slack, or even
seek to lobby the regulator, rather than to amend the original behaviour for
reducing regulatory costs. 101 In contrast to the under-specification, there
would also be a problem of over-specification (i.e., over-inclusiveness).102
Rather than failing to catch all forms of harmful conduct, over-inclusive

97. These private enforcement tools based on private litigations, or public enforcement tools based
on regulatory sanctions, will also largely deter companies’ irresponsible behaviour and thereby increase
the corporate accountability.
98. See Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 190 (2007).
99. See id. at 194.
100. John Armour & Jeffrey Gordon, Systematic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 JOURNAL OF
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 48 (2014).
101. For example, “exercise[ing] political influence to achieve a lower rate of regulatory tax” rather
than seeking “innovation that reduces the social costs of one’s activities in accordance with regulatory
strictures.” Id. at 38.
102. See ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY
AND PRACTICE 103-06 (1999).

2 - YAN _ZHANG - V9 - KC - 10.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2020]

CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY

11/15/2019 11:11 AM

61

regulation may interfere with legitimate activities. Moreover, as summarized
by Parkinson, apart from the technical limitation, there are jurisdictional and
politico-economic limitations on conventional regulation. 103 For example,
regulatory standards on the same activity can vary among different countries,
especially between developed and developing countries. 104 It may be
difficult for developing countries to raise their standards to match those in
the developed countries, due to a concern that more stringent regulations will
make them less attractive for inward investment. Another point worth
mentioning is that nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and other
parties who advocate for CSR may themselves be interested groups seeking
rents through lobbying within the current legal, institutional framework with
the aim of obtaining what may not be easily or cheaply able to obtain in the
market.105 The new regulations, in the form of new CSR statutes, may be the
products of their influence. 106 Therefore, whether the so-called CSR
regulatory initiatives are genuinely in the interests of wider society may be
taken with a pinch of salt, at least in some cases.
The foregoing discussions in Section III demonstrate that in addition to
the market forces, legal forces can also be used to tackle corporate
irresponsibility. Affected parties may use innovative manners to hold
companies accountable.107 However, it is not the purpose of this paper to
encourage mandating CSR-related requirements or incorporating all of them
into the mandatory legal system under the current neoliberal context where
the emphasis is on deregulation.108 Rather, the discussion above shows the
potential of traditional corporate responsibility, which was previously
regarded as intrinsically voluntary, to be enforceable. As an already well103. See John Parkinson, Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance:
Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. OF CORP. L. STUDIES 3, 29-31 (2003).
104. Karin Buhmann, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Current Issues and Their Relevance
for Implementation of Law, 22 THE COPENHAGEN JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES 77 (2005). (arguing that
developing countries such as China may adopt a relatively low standard regulation for environmental and
labour protection while some buyer companies may, due to ethical and moral reasons, choose to purchase
products or services from the Chinese suppliers which comply with a higher standard according to
international law or other applicable law).
105. See Donald J. Kochan, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Remedy-Seeking Society: A Public
Choice Perspective, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 413, 441 (2014).
106. See id. at 436.
107. Particularly for small and medium-sized companies who may not have a strong incentive to
comply with voluntary CSR responsibilities—due to the limited reputational and financial gains from
compliance, as suggested by Doreen McBarnet—legal mechanisms would become the only route for
aggrieved parties to seek remedies against companies.
108. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World
Order, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 71, 71 (2009); see also Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational
Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 390 (2005); Mark T.
Kawakami, Pitfalls of Over-Legalization: When the Law Crowds Out and Spills Over, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 147, 155 (2017).
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established system, the law109 could facilitate the development of corporate
responsibility as well as corporate accountability.
Admittedly, it would be difficult to hold companies accountable beyond
the law. Apart from the moral restraint and market forces, an innovative
application of existing legal mechanisms, as explored above, proffers a
potential solution. For example, companies’ CSR commitments can not only
be viewed as a type of self-constraint from a social-legal perspective to
reduce the externalities,110 but also as potentially controlled by competition
law or contract law with a legal impact.
It has been identified that enforcement based on private law has a
structural role to play in the system of public regulation in that private
litigations may fill some gaps left by the public enforcement regimes.111 The
effectiveness of public or private enforcement may depend on their
respective informational advantages in a particular setting. In some cases,
employees and suppliers may have first-hand information due to their direct
losses or harms caused by corporate irresponsibility. Therefore, private
litigations brought by those parties may facilitate regulators to supervise
certain activities of companies. Private enforcement mechanisms of CSR do
not necessarily mean replacing voluntary mechanisms or public enforcement
regimes; rather, the relationship between private enforcement mechanisms
and public ones can be complementary.
Corporate accountability could exist at the international level, however,
as it is still under-developed, and there is no effective international
enforcement court or mechanisms yet available.112 As a result, enforcement
mechanisms, based on national law, seem to be attractive options at the time
being.113 One may point out that private law, including contract law and tort
law, are malleable materials, which can be used to adapt to new changes in
social and economic contexts. If legislators believe that there is a strong
social need to regulate CSR-related issues, formal regulation may be enacted
and implemented either by public authorities or private parties.
In practice, it may be difficult to draw a clear line between voluntary
CSR enforcement, private enforcement, and public enforcement, as they may
be intertwined. Depending on the degree of involvement of private parties
109. See, e.g., Jan M. Smits, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Under Private Law:
On the Disciplining Power of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 99,106 (2017).
110. See Anna Beckers, Legalization Under the Premises of Globalization: Why and Where to Enforce
Corporate Social Responsibility Codes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 15, 26 (2017).
111. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanism in Public Law, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1137, 1176 (2012).
112. See Anna Beckers & Mark T. Kawakami, Why Domestic Enforcement of Private Regulation is
(Not) the Answer: Making and Questioning the Case of Corporate Social Responsibility, 24 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2017).
113. See id. at 6.
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and the harshness of the regulation, the regulation can be categorised into
self-regulation by private parties, hard law regulation by states, nonbinding
soft law regulation (aiming to persuade corporates to do something), civil
regulation where NGOs play an important role, and co-regulation where
public and private work together to regulate a certain area or industry.114
Many NGOs, administrative agencies, and private parties have already
started to creatively enforce the voluntary CSR responsibilities basis on
private law, including contract and tort law.115 After becoming shareholders,
NGOs can influence companies’ internal governance through shareholder
meetings and resolutions.116 In certain industries, self-regulation and public
regulation are not easily separated as they may have a relationship of mutual
influence or collaborative rulemaking. 117 For example, public regulations
may be made by public organisations while private agencies implement the
supervision. Also, it is equally possible to have a process where both public
and private parties are involved in regulation-making meetings.118
Both the process and outcome of transposing corporate responsibility,
which is intrinsically voluntary, to corporate accountability, which can be
seen as legally implementable, is worth our attention. Some have argued that
implementable substantive values and mechanisms should be the basis of the
accountability regimes of corporate responsibility, while the process should
be able to subject internal corporate governance to external stakeholders and
their influences.119 Meanwhile, there is a need to maintain a balance between
the accountability of companies and the efficiency of managers’ decisionmaking.120 It is true that to assert that a high level of corporate accountability,
especially in a case where directors need to consider a variety of stakeholders’
interests, may slow down the efficiency of decision-making and blur the
focus of the management team. However, without implementable external
monitoring from affected stakeholders, companies may not be responsible
for their externalities.

114. See, e.g., Richard Steurer, The Role of Governments in Corporate Social Responsibility:
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V. CONCLUSION
Compared with corporate responsibility, which focuses on the
introduction of rights and duties, corporate accountability focuses more on
its implementation. The legal mechanisms discussed in this paper
demonstrate the possibility of having a more enforceable framework to
ensure corporate accountability and implement the corresponding rights and
duties without any material changes to the current legal environment.
Primary stakeholder groups, who are most likely to affect, or be affected by,
corporate behaviour, can seek recourse through existing laws by
innovatively seeking remedies in addition to traditional forms, such as
boycotts or strikes.
It is, however, important to bear in mind that no single mechanism is
sufficient to tackle all accountability concerns alone, due to each having their
own weakness and limitation. Holding companies accountable must include
multiple layers of legal tools. At the same time, legal intervention does not
necessarily make market forces redundant. For example, some legal
mechanisms such as disclosure requirements under corporate law may in
turn strengthen the market force in disciplining corporate behaviour by
increasing transparency.
From lawyers’ eyes, enforceability is itself an important topic.
Responsibility as a duty to perform or refrain from performing would be
inefficiently affected if it did not come with accountability for the failure of
compliance. Discussing corporate social responsibility without an
enforceable framework is less convincing, especially when the voluntary
adoption or engagement of truly responsible behaviour is currently
problematic. By shifting the focus from seeking the introduction of rights
and duties to their effective implementation, this paper wishes to serve as a
starting point of corporate accountability debate for future scholars interested
in CSR topics.

